In a new paper in the Evolutionary Nash Program published in Games and Economic Behavior, Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip Neary and Jonathan Newton show how egalitarianism can emerge in asymmetric environments.
Specifically, when coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents’ non-best response behavior, the Egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Without intentional bias, a new solution, the Logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm.
These results contrast with results under non-payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai–Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms.
Experiments on human subjects, reported in the paper, suggest that non-best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias. This suggests the Egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm.