The Evolutionary Nash Program

The Evolutionary Nash Program  is a literature that studies connections between evolutionary game theory and cooperative game theory. It is named after the original Nash Program, proposed by John Nash, that studies connections between non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory.

Nash Program Non-cooperative game theory  <-> Cooperative game theory
Evolutionary Nash Program Evolutionary game theory <-> Cooperative game theory

Models within the Evolutionary Nash Program give a social norm, or to put it another way, a social choice, as output.

So, although most of the Evolutionary Nash Program does not explicitly feature collective agency, it does show the emergence of social norms that can, in turn, facilitate collective agency.

One strand of the Evolutionary Nash Program looks at the links between coordination games under perturbed dynamics (evolutionary game theory) and bargaining solutions (cooperative game theory).

Conventional contracts, H.P.Young, Review of Economic Studies (1997).

Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play, S.Naidu, S-H.Hwang & S.Bowles, Economics Letters (2010).

Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry, S-H Hwang, W.Lim, P.Neary & J.Newton, Working Paper (2016).

Another strand of the Evolutionary Nash Program looks at Nash demand games under perturbed dynamics (evolutionary game theory) and selection within the core (cooperative game theory).

An evolutionary model of bargaining, H.P.Young, Journal of Economic Theory (1993).

Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games, M.Agastya, Journal of Economic Theory (1999).

Recontracting and stochastic stability, J.Newton, Journal of Economic Theory (2012).

Yet another area within the Evolutionary Nash Program analyzes selection within the core in matching models.

Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games, H.H.Nax & B.S.R.Pradelski, International Journal of Game Theory (2015).

Stochastic stability in assignment problems, B.Klaus & J.Newton, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2016).